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Abstract
We study trading and prices in newly issued municipal bonds. Municipals, which trade in
decentralized, broker-dealer markets, are underpriced when issued, but unlike equities the average
price rises slowly over a period of several days. We document high levels of price dispersion in newly
issued bonds, and show that the average drift upward in price is because of changes in the mix of
trades over time. While large trades occur close to the reoﬀering price, and close to each other, small
trades occur at a wide range of prices almost simultaneously. Some small investors appear to be
informed about the status of the issue, and trade on attractive terms. Others appear uninformed,
and often buy at prices as much as ﬁve percent above the reoﬀering price, at which informed
traders buy. We estimate a mixed-distribution model that highlights ex-ante characteristics that
discriminate between these types of investors, and quantiﬁes the losses uninformed traders or issuers
give up to broker-dealers.1 Introduction
In his seminal paper, “A Model of Sales,” Hal Varian wrote some twenty-ﬁve years ago: “Economists
have belatedly come to recognize that the ‘law of one price’ is no law at all. Many retail markets
are instead characterized by a rather large degree of price dispersion.”
The recognition Varian refers to has arrived even more belatedly in ﬁnancial economics, where
through arbitrage arguments, the law of one price plays a central role in the major theoretical
results of both corporation ﬁnance and asset pricing. Whether and when ﬁnancial assets sell at
multiple prices simultaneously is an empirical question that has received little attention.
We study the market for newly issued municipal bonds, and demonstrate that there is substan-
tial price dispersion for the bonds. Trades on one side of the market occur at radically diﬀerent
prices almost simultaneously. We argue that the price dispersion is the result of dealers’ ability to
discriminate between informed and uninformed customers. We ﬁt a mixed-distribution model that
highlights characteristics separating informed and uninformed investors, and allows us to estimate
the value dealers capture from uninformed buyers. Analogous to the models of costly consumer
search, such as Varian (1980) and Burdett and Judd (1983), some buyers appear to know which
bonds are “on sale” at a given point in time, and others do not. The dispersion in prices appears
to be sustainable because of the institutional mechanisms through which the bonds are issued, and
the decentralized, opaque market setting in which they are traded.
The municipal bond market is a classic, decentralized broker-dealer market. Pricing information
is costly to obtain, and transactions prices have not, until recently, been recorded in a central
source. Other over-the-counter markets, such as corporate and treasury bonds, are dominated by
institutional investors trading in large quantities. The tax-exempt status of municipals, however,
makes them attractive to individual, retail investors. Like in equity markets, large institutional
traders and small investors coexist in the municipal market, but unlike in equity markets there is
no pre-trade transparency and limited post-trade transparency.
Our sample was collected by the Municipal Securities Rule Making Board (MSRB) as a ﬁrst step
in their eﬀorts to create a more transparent venue for trading. These data record all transactions by
registered broker-dealers, but were only made available to the public with a lag. Transactions are
identiﬁed as sales by dealers to customers, purchases by dealers from customers, and interdealer
1trades. We match these transactions data with information on new issues hand collected from
prospectuses and provided to us by Primuni.com. Our data include 190,300 trades in 12,493 new
bonds issued in 1,000 deals from February 2000 though July 2003.
We document substantial underpricing for new issues, particularly those targeted for the retail
market. In the equity markets, the most underpriced issues are also likely to be the most over-
subscribed, so that the underwriters themselves do not beneﬁt directly from the underpricing. In
the municipal market, bonds are likely to be taken into inventory, or sold to other dealers in the
underwriting syndicate, at or below the reoﬀering price,1 so that the underwriter-dealers do beneﬁt
directly from underpricing. Moreover, the underpricing only emerges gradually. An issuer who
simply compared the reoﬀering price on the bond to average transactions prices on the ﬁrst day of
trading would underestimate the extent of underpricing, along with the proﬁts to the underwriters.
While average prices increase steadily in the days following the start of trading in new issues,
the price increase does not appear to be the result of gradual price discovery or the release of
information. The prices at which dealers trade with each other and the prices at which dealers
purchase bonds from customers do not drift upward. Instead, a large proportion of customers buy
the bonds at the reoﬀering price, while others, simultaneously, purchase at a wide range of prices
that can be much higher than the reoﬀering price.
Prices at which customers buy have a bimodal distribution in the early days of a bond’s life.
But the price dispersion does not coincide in a direct manner with dispersion in proxies for the
customer’s type. For a variety of reasons we might expect trading costs to be lower for large buyers.
There are surely ﬁxed costs associated with processing trades and identifying counterparties. Large,
institutional traders are also likely to be more continuously engaged in the market, increasing their
access to pricing information, and to have repeated interactions with broker-dealers, increasing
their bargaining power with them. We might expect, then, that large traders obtain good prices,
while small traders do not.
We ﬁnd, however, that while large purchasers obtain their bonds at lower and less variable
prices, many small purchases occur on very attractive terms. Other small trades do not. A natural
1The “oﬀering price” is the price the underwriter promises to the issuer, and the “reoﬀering price” is the price at
which the bonds are sold to the public who participate in the primary oﬀering. The diﬀerence between the two is the
underwriter’s spread. The reoﬀering yield is the yield computed using the reoﬀering price.
2explanation for such behavior is that small buyers diﬀer widely in terms of how well informed
they are about the bonds they are buying. Some small buyers know the bonds have recently been
issued, and know the reoﬀering yield, which serves as a natural focal point in negotiating with
broker-dealers. Others do not. Larger traders, in contrast, are more homogeneously informed.
As time passes from the start of trading, information about the particular issue is more costly to
obtain or less widely available, and the mix of informed and uninformed traders changes, leading
to predictable rises in average prices.
We document the price behavior descriptively by stratifying the sample by trade size and days
from the start of trading, and studying the extent of price dispersion. The price dispersion is
economically signiﬁcant. For bonds with high levels of retail participation, prices vary by ﬁve
percent or more, which is roughly the annual yield on a municipal bond during the sample period.
We also estimate a mixed-distribution model, which treats trades as drawn from two distrib-
utions, one for informed buyers and the other for uninformed buyers. A latent variable for the
cost of becoming informed determines the distribution from which an observation is drawn. Using
the estimated parameters from the model, we calculate the “money left on the table” by buyers.
Money left on the table is a measure of the surplus accruing to broker-dealers that buyers could have
captured by becoming informed. Since the money left on the table accrues to the broker-dealers
rather than the issuers, it also measures the surplus that issuers could have captured by obtaining
direct access to the ultimate buyers. On average, the money left on the table amounts to a quarter
of the proﬁts underwriter-dealers earn on an issue.
If trading is costly for individual investors, or if it is costly for them to acquire the institutional
sophistication that would allow them to trade on better terms, then we would expect intermediaries
to oﬀer them this information indirectly through delegated portfolio management. Mutual funds
are one way for individuals to trade on institutional terms, at the cost of fees and loss of direct
control over their portfolio. Our estimates of the costs of trading to individuals suggest they value
direct control.
Some delegation mechanisms may involve fees that are not directly observable in our data, and
would lead us to overstate the apparent sophistication of some small traders and understate the
costs of trading for them. Examples are so–called “managed accounts” with annual “wrap fees”
3that are a percentage of assets under management, and “agency trades” that involve a commission
not reported in our data.
To evaluate the importance of such eﬀects, we exclude or consolidate transactions that are likely
to be agency or managed-account trades. We also include proxies for likely managed account trades
in our mixed-distribution model. The robust nature of our ﬁndings suggests many retail investors
obtain attractive terms of trade directly, which is not surprising given the wide availability of
information about upcoming municipal bond issues. Moreover, both wrap fees and commissions
on agency trades are small relative to the dispersion we observe in the prices retail investors pay.
This is what we would expect if intermediaries compete more aggressively on dimensions that are
transparent to investors. Competitive forces should limit relatively transparent sources of cost to
investors, such as commissions or wrap fees.
The behavior of prices for newly issued municipals, which trade over the counter, stands in
marked contrast to that of public oﬀerings of equity, which trade on organized exchanges. For Initial
Public Oﬀerings (IPOs) there is a great deal of uncertainty about the value of the underlying assets.
As with municipals, both retail and institutional investors are active in the aftermarket for equities.
Yet price adjustment takes place almost immediately in the secondary market—subsequent price
movements are largely unpredictable over short horizons.
Underpricing is a cost to the issuer, and its sources are not fully understood. For IPOs, however,
the equity issuance process makes the underpricing transparent to everyone involved. The ﬁrst
transaction on the exchange gives issuers a good measure of how much their shares have been
underpriced. The puzzle is why, given the market transparency, competition between underwriters
and self-interested behavior by issuers does not reduce the underpricing. In the municipal market,
on the other hand, there is no single “market price” by which to measure the costs to issuers or
uninformed investors. There are market prices.
The price dispersion also creates complications for the tax authority. The tax code limits the
returns issuers can earn on municipal bond proceeds to preclude tax-arbitrage strategies. These
limitations are stated in terms of the reoﬀering yield. Underwriters are required to certify to the
bond counsel that at least ten percent of each issue is sold at the reoﬀering yield, which is then
deemed the “market price.” In our sample, large portions of many issues are not sold at the
4reoﬀering yield, and in a substantial fraction of the issues none of the bonds are sold at or above
the reoﬀering yield.
Several papers have shown recently that the costs of trade for retail investors in over-the-counter
bond markets can be very high, and that these costs are related to the degree of transparency in
the market place. Harris and Piwowar (2005) use time-series methods to estimate trading costs for
municipal bonds, and show these are decreasing in trade size. Green, Holliﬁeld and Sch¨ urhoﬀ (2005)
match buys and sales in seasoned bonds to estimate the proﬁts to dealers from liquidity provision.
Their structural model yields estimates of relative bargaining power for customers and dealers that
depend on trade size. Biais and Green (2005) compare trading costs in the current environment
to costs during historical periods when bonds were actively traded on exchanges. Bessembinder,
Maxwell and Venkataraman (2005), Edwards, Harris and Piwowar (2005) and Goldstein, Hotchkiss
and Sirri (2005) study the costs of trade in corporate bonds, and show that increased post-trade
transparency lowered trading costs.
All of these studies are informative about the eﬀects of the relative lack of price transparency
on liquidity. The nature and direction of causality is diﬃcult to assess, however. The trading
venue, costs of trade, and frequency of trade are themselves jointly endogenous outcomes. Perhaps
the bonds trade in decentralized, opaque markets in part because investors rarely need or want to
trade them, and the costs are high because it is extremely diﬃcult for intermediaries to identify and
match counterparties. The transactions we study are taking place in a setting with an exogenous
need for relatively high volume of trade. The newly issued bonds must be moved through the
inventories of intermediating dealers to ﬁnal investors. Even though considerable trade is going on,
we still see small investors trading on radically diﬀerent terms than large investors, and on radically
diﬀerent terms from each other, at virtually the same instant in time. If price information were
more transparent, especially pre-trade price information, it seems unlikely this could occur.
The municipal market is also a particularly appropriate venue in which to study the impact
of transparency on trade terms, because individual, retail investors are a natural clientele for the
bonds. Tax considerations make corporate and government bonds relatively unattractive to hold
directly, as opposed to in tax-deferred accounts which are typically intermediated. If it proves costly
for individuals to trade in the corporate market, therefore, it is unclear that this is in any way costly.
5In the municipal market, 39 percent of outstanding bonds are held directly by households,2 and if
it is costly for them to trade these holdings there is surely some associated welfare loss.
In the next section we describe the process through which municipal bonds are issued, and our
sample of new bonds and trades. Section 3 analyzes the evolution and dispersion of prices through
time. We also show that many oﬀerings fail to meet IRS requirements that ten per cent of the
bonds are sold at the reoﬀering yield. In Section 4 we estimate a mixture model of the determinants
of the markup over the reoﬀering price for informed and na¨ ıve investors. Section 5 concludes by
discussing the policy issues related to our research. The Appendix describes construction of our
sample.
2 Municipal Bond Issuance and the Sample
The primary market for municipal bonds is large both in terms of value and the number of oﬀerings.
The value of new issues has risen steadily in the last two decades, from roughly $60 billion per year
in the early 1980s to $458 billion in 2005.3 In the municipal market the number of issuers is large,
and the size of each issue is small in comparison to the corporate market. Municipal bonds are issued
through private placement, through competitive bidding in auctions called competitive oﬀerings, or
through direct negotiations with an underwriter called negotiated oﬀerings. Competitive oﬀerings
were once widely required by state law, but in most states these laws have gradually been repealed or
relaxed, and currently most oﬀerings are negotiated. In 2005, 18.6% of new issues were competitive,
80.9% were negotiated, and 0.5% were privately placed.
Municipal bonds are usually issued in series. A typical deal will involve the simultaneous oﬀering
of multiple coupon bearing bonds with a range of maturities. We will refer to bonds trading with
separate CUSIP numbers as “issues” and the collections of bonds issued simultaneously in a single
underwriting as “deals.”
Our sample comes from two sources. We have data hand collected from prospectuses by
Primuni.com for 1,048 deals involving 13,987 bonds and 862 issuers. The ﬁrst deal was on Febru-
ary 15, 2000 and the last deal was on May 1, 2003. We apply a number of ﬁlters described in the
2Statistics on holdings are available from The Bond Market Association at http://www.bondmarkets.com. House-
hold holdings of municipals have varied between 36 and 55 percent of outstanding supply over the last 20 years.
3The source of these aggregate statistics is The Bond Market Association.
6Appendix to eliminate obvious data errors. After cleaning the sample, we are left with 1,000 deals
and 12,493 separate issues from 833 diﬀerent municipal entities. These data supply us with CUSIP
number, coupon, maturity, issuer, state, underwriter discount or spread, reoﬀering price at which
the bond is oﬀered to the public, and reoﬀering yield. The number of diﬀerent bonds in the sample
is substantially larger than the number of deals, since municipals are issued in series. There are
fewer issuers than deals, because some large issuers are in the market repeatedly over the sample
period.
We have matched these bonds to transactions prices recorded by the Municipal Securities Rule
Making Board (MSRB) data made available to the public as part of their attempts to gradually
increase transparency in the municipal bond market. The MSRB database has been used to study
trading costs in the municipal market by Green, Holliﬁeld and Sch¨ urhoﬀ (2005), Harris and Pi-
wowar (2005), and Hong and Warga (2004). The database records all trades in municipal bonds by
registered broker-dealers. The individual dealer codes are not recorded, but transactions are sepa-
rately identiﬁed as purchases from a customer, sales to a customer, or interdealer trades. We follow
the bonds for sixty trading days, or roughly three months after trading begins, so our transaction
sample runs from February 15, 2000 to August 1, 2003. It includes 190,300 transactions.
Our sample is a small fraction of the total number of new issues in the MSRB data over this
period. We would expect the issues selected by PriMuni tend to be larger and more actively traded
than the median issue. To evaluate the representativeness of our sample, we have searched the
MSRB database for all transactions in new bonds during the Primuni sample period. As a check
on the reliability of our search of the MSRB data, for bonds in the Primuni sample we compared
data items common to the data collected by Primuni from oﬃcial statements and the MSRB
transactions data. The comparison suggests that the search procedure provides accurate results for
the entire market, since both approaches provide virtually identical results for the Primuni sample.
The summary statistics in Table 1 for our sample, and for the broader universe of new bonds,
include issue size and deal size, trading volume and number of transactions, bond characteristics
such as rating, maturity in years, coupon rate, call features, tax status, use of funds, the issuer
type and the state of issuance. We report means and medians for all applicable statistics at the
individual issue level and aggregated to the deal level.
7The Primuni sample comprises slightly larger and more frequently traded deals, though the
bias is not uniform across the diﬀerent measures and statistics. All of the credit rating, maturity,
coupon, call features, tax status, and issuer types are very similar to the broader universe. Both the
Primuni sample and the broader market are predominantly deals in large population-rich, high-net-
worth states such as California, Texas, New York, and Pennsylvania. The Primuni sample contains
more school district issuers and Pennsylvania issuers in comparison to the population of all new
issues, which is not surprising given Primuni’s location in Pittsburgh.
In a negotiated oﬀering, the senior manager in the underwriting syndicate purchases the bonds
from the issuer two to three weeks prior to the settlement date, when the bonds are actually
delivered to the underwriter. In the intervening period, the underwriter bears price risk, and the
senior manager and the comanagers can sell the bonds to customers or to other dealers on a “when
issued” basis. When issued sales are forward contracts between the underwriters and customers to
accept the bonds when they are delivered at the closing.
There is no formal distinction between the primary and secondary market for new issues of
municipal bonds. For tax reasons, dealers must certify to the IRS that they sell at least ten percent
of each issue at the reoﬀering yield. Subject to the constraint, however, once trading begins dealers
holding the bonds in inventory are free to sell bonds at whatever price the market will bear.
Customers who are informed about an upcoming or recent issue, and about the reoﬀering price,
can ask their broker to ﬁll an order for that particular bond at the reoﬀering price, or close to it.
Other customers, who simply wish to purchase a municipal bond with certain characteristics, may
be quoted very diﬀerent prices when their brokers contact their ﬁrm’s retail trading desk.
The original purchases of bonds from the issuer by the senior managers are not recorded in the
MSRB data, but the subsequent sales of the bonds to the public are. Suppose an investor places
an order for bonds in an upcoming issue with a broker at the reoﬀering price. If the broker’s ﬁrm is
the senior manager, this will appear in our sample as a sale to a customer at the reoﬀering price in
the when-issued market or immediately following the settlement date. If the broker’s ﬁrm is not the
senior manager, then there will ﬁrst be an interdealer trade below the reoﬀering price followed by
a sale to a customer at the reoﬀering price. Alternatively, members of the underwriting syndicate
can take the bonds into inventory, and then hope to sell them to less well informed investors. For
8the senior manager, we will then just observe the sales to customer, typically above the reoﬀering
price. For other syndicate members, there will be an interdealer trade below the reoﬀering price
followed by sales to customers.
It is often the case that large hedge funds, or similar institutions, substitute for broker-dealers
and intermediate the process through which large blocks of bonds are broken into smaller pieces
as they make their way to the retail market, particularly when the senior manager does not have
retail distribution capacity. Such intermediaries are referred to as “ﬂippers.” The ﬂipper takes a
large block of bonds from the underwriters, and then resells the bonds to dealers such as regional
brokerage ﬁrms with retail sales networks. In such situations our sample shows a large sale to
a customer at the reoﬀering price or close to it, followed by smaller purchases from customers,
typically at a higher price. We then see even smaller sales to customers, with additional markups.
The economics of the underwriting process tend to discourage brokers from direct participation
in the primary market on behalf of their customers, or from informing them about upcoming issues.
For example, the average underwriter spread in our data is close to 0.8%. Most of the spread—
0.5% to 0.6%—will be the sales credit, which represents the brokerage ﬁrm’s gross commission.
The individual broker dealing with a retail customer makes at most 40% of the brokerage ﬁrm’s
gross commission, or 0.2% to 0.24% of the 0.8% underwriter spread. The broker dealing with a
retail customer therefore ends up with a commission of roughly $20 on a $10,000 retail transaction.
Such a commission is below many ﬁrms’ minimum amount for writing a trade ticket.
Alternatively, suppose the broker sells newly issued bonds held in inventory. The markup over
the reoﬀering price might, given our results, be over 2% on a retail-oriented, smaller issue. For a
bond with a 2% markup, 0.125% is proﬁt for the retail trading desk and the remaining 1.875% is
the broker’s gross commission. At most 40% of the broker’s gross commission, or 0.75% is available
to the individual broker; this amounts to $75 on a $10,000 retail transaction.
The basic patterns of trade for newly issued bonds are quite evident from the summary statistics
in Table 2. During the ﬁrst sixty trading days sales to customers constitute most of the transactions,
but the transactions sizes are smaller than interdealer trades or purchases from customers. Sales
to customers nevertheless represent 57% of the dollar volume.
Table 3 describes the distribution of transaction frequency across newly issued bonds in our
9sample over the ﬁrst sixty days of trade. Trading activity is highly skewed in the cross section of
bonds, with a relatively small number of issues accounting for most of the trading. For example,
half of the bonds in our sample show four or fewer sales to customers, but the mean number of sales
to customers is eleven, and the standard deviation of the number of sales is over three times the
mean. The same patterns are evident in other measures of volume, in purchases from customers,
and in interdealer trading.
Newly issued bonds are relatively actively traded, but as the bonds ﬁnd their way into retail
and mutual fund portfolios the volume of trade drops oﬀ dramatically. Table 4 illustrates the drop
oﬀ. Conditional on sales to customers taking place on the ﬁrst day of trade, the ﬁrst day sales
account for 73% of the par value of the issue. After ﬁve days of seasoning, this measure falls to
around 12%, and after ten days to around 9%. Average trade size falls dramatically after the ﬁrst
day, but thereafter decreases slowly. Thus, while the bonds are ﬁnding their way to smaller buyers
through time, both large and small buyers remain active throughout the period. The evolution of
activity is not just driven by a search for smaller and smaller retail buyers.
The size of interdealer trades does not fall oﬀ as quickly over time as the size of trades to
customers, and the average size of purchases from customers actually increases through time. The
trade sizes reﬂect two types of liquidity provision on the part of dealers. First, ﬂippers re-enter the
market and sell large positions to dealers with retail distribution capacity. Second, in the market for
seasoned bonds, dealers typically provide liquidity for mutual funds and hedge funds by purchasing
large blocks of bonds and reselling them in smaller quantities to other customers.
3 New Issue Underpricing
3.1 The Evolution of Prices Through Time
Figure 1 illustrates the histories of sales to customers for eight individual bonds from our sample
covering a range of typical behaviors. The panels include both actively and less actively traded
bonds. In each plot, the horizontal axis is days since the initiation of trade, and the vertical axis
is the diﬀerence between the transaction price and the reoﬀering price, measured as a percentage
of the reoﬀering price. We refer to this percentage as the markup the dealer earns on the sale.
10All eight issues depicted show sales to customers with a zero markup on the ﬁrst day of trading,
and most of them continue to show sales to customers at that markup through time, although the
frequency with which zero markups occur diminishes over time.
The markups show a general upward trend through time. What appears remarkable, however,
is the degree of dispersion in the markups that emerges almost immediately after the bond is issued,
particularly for the more actively traded bonds. On the more actively traded bonds, customers are
buying, apparently simultaneously, at prices ranging between the reoﬀering price and premiums of
5% over the reoﬀering price. All of the bonds depicted were issued with annual coupons between
4% and 6%. The dispersion in prices ranges from half to almost all of a year’s coupon payment.
To what extent are such behaviors typical of the sample more broadly? To what extent is the
heterogeneity in price associated with heterogeneity in trader type?
Figure 2 plots mean and median gross markups over the reoﬀering price on each type of trans-
action against days since the initial trade. The upward trend in the mean and median prices at
which sales to customers are occurring is striking. Average and median prices at which customers
buy increase dramatically over the ﬁrst three days, and then continue to increase at a slower rate
to 1.5% over the reoﬀering price. Prices at which dealers trade with each other are much ﬂatter
through time.
From Table 2, purchases from customers are much larger in size during the early days of trade
than are sales to customers, suggesting the customers selling to dealers are primarily institutions.
The prices at which large customer sales to dealers occur also has a relatively ﬂat trajectory. Dealers
and large institutions are likely to be well informed traders. Since the prices at which dealers and
large institutions trade do not show the same dramatic upward trend as sales to customers, it seems
unlikely that the trend in average prices upward is attributable to the release of information, or
biases in initial market expectations.
3.2 Price Dispersion
Inspection of the transactions histories for individual bonds in Figure 1 suggests that the predictable
evolution of average and median prices may obscure heterogeneity in prices for particular bonds
at any given time. Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of markups on sales to customers over the
11ﬁrst ﬁve days for the whole cross section of bonds. The ﬁrst panel is a frequency plot of the actual
markups. The frequency distribution appears bimodal, with a large spike at zero and the remaining
transactions spread out over a range from roughly -3% to 5%. The relative importance of the sales
occurring at the reoﬀering price decreases across days. We would expect the distribution to become
more spread out as information accumulates, moving expectations away from those prevailing when
the bond was initially priced. But even ﬁve days after trading starts, a large portion of sales to
customers occur at a zero markup.
The second panel of Figure 3 shows the same frequencies as in the ﬁrst panel, but with the
sales at the reoﬀering price—a markup of zero—eliminated. While we would expect information
arrival to spread out the distribution of markups, the distribution appears remarkably stable aside
from the decreasing frequency of trades at the reoﬀering price. On the ﬁrst day of trading, the
distribution is relatively symmetric. From that point on the distribution appears skewed upward,
with very little change in the range of outcomes or the mass in the tails. We omit the plot for the
distribution of markups adjusted for movements in a broad-based municipal bond index because it
looks virtually identical. The pattern in Figure 3 suggests most of the changes in the average prices
across days are attributable to the mix between customers purchasing at the reoﬀering price, and
customers purchasing at higher prices.
A natural interpretation of the changing mix of trades is that as the bond becomes more seasoned
and trade becomes less frequent, fewer potential purchasers are informed about the new issue and
the reoﬀering price. Alternatively, in may be that trader types are changing. Large traders are
more likely to be able to trade on attractive terms, either because of superior bargaining power or
because there are economies of scale for the dealers in servicing large traders. Suppose that larger
traders dominate the set of potential purchasers in the early stages of an issue’s life, and the bonds
only gradually ﬁnd their way to smaller investors who are more expensive to service. We would
then expect to see average prices rising, reﬂecting the cost structure of the intermediaries.
Figure 4 sheds some light on how the evolution of prices depends on trader type. The top panel
shows the evolution of average markups, stratiﬁed by trade size, across days. The second panel
plots the same averages, with sales at the reoﬀering price removed. The upward trend in markups
is evident for all but the largest trade sizes in the top panel. The price paths in the lower panel are
12ﬂat for the smaller trade sizes, and almost all of the increase in price is associated with the ﬁrst
day for the medium-sized trades.
Unconditionally, a retail purchase of $10,000 has an expected markup of 70 basis points on the
ﬁrst day. Conditional on not buying at the reoﬀering price, however, a retail trader should expect
to pay a 180 basis point markup. The diﬀerences between the unconditional expected markup and
the markup conditional on not purchasing at the reoﬀering price for trades of $5,000 and $25,000
are equally dramatic. Trade size would seem to be the most obvious source of heterogeneity one
would associate with the costs to the intermediaries of providing their services, and yet it appears
that the broad behaviors we see in the aggregates are also evident for trades of any given size, as
long as the trade size is retail.
In Table 5 we examine the within day dispersion of prices, and its evolution across days. The
columns on the left deﬁne the conditioning information. For example, 54% of issues with sales to
customers on the ﬁrst day show multiple transactions, and for 27% of the issues with sales on the
ﬁrst day the price varies across transactions. The remaining four columns show the percentages of
issues exhibiting price diﬀerences within a given range. On the ﬁrst day, in just over half of the
issues with price dispersion, that dispersion is limited to less than 50 basis points, while in 9% of
the issues the maximum diﬀerence between prices at which customers purchase exceeds 2%. The
percentages of issues showing high levels of price dispersion increases after the ﬁrst day. Consistent
with the frequency plots for the pooled transactions data in Figure 3, the dispersion of prices within
days remains quite stable after the ﬁrst day.
Dealers surely face ﬁxed costs in processing trades, and for this reason we would expect lower
percentage markups on larger trades. Heterogeneity in trade size, rather than in customer informa-
tion, might be an explanation for the behavior evident in the top panel of Figure 3. Large purchases
are much more frequent in the ﬁrst few days of trade. Perhaps large traders simply receive the
reoﬀering price, while small traders have to pay a higher price.
We examine how the size of the customers’ purchases aﬀects the dispersion of the prices in
Table 6. We report measures of the intraday range in markups for the three most frequent trans-
action sizes $10,000, $25,000, $50,000 plus an aggregate measure for institutional transactions of
$250,000 or more. The dispersion in prices is apparent in a number of trade sizes. After the ﬁrst
13day of trading, the intraday price dispersion exceeds 50 basis points for 25%-40% of all issues with
multiple trades for all trades of up to $50,000 in par value. Customers making very large purchases,
in excess of $250,000 in par value, face very little dispersion in prices.
The histograms in Figure 5 provide visual evidence of how the dispersion in prices varies with
trade size. For each sale to customer within a trade-size category over the ﬁrst sixty days, we
subtract the within-day average markup for trades of that size in that bond. The upper panel plots
the resulting markups for all trades, while the bottom panel plots only those trades on days with
price variation. Evidently, the distribution is much more concentrated around the within-day mean
for larger trade-size categories.
In a classically eﬃcient ﬁnancial market, the price process behaves like a martingale. Transac-
tions prices close together in time should be tightly centered on a single point. As time progresses,
the modal price should move up or down, and the variance of price changes from the starting point
should increase through the accumulation of shocks to investors’ information sets. Table 7 provides
evidence that prices for large trades behave in this way, and much less evidence that the prices for
small trades behave in this way.
The top panel reports the percentage of dealer sales to customers at the reoﬀering price for
trades in diﬀerent categories across days after the start of trading. The bottom panel reports the
percentages at or below the reoﬀering price. The percentage of customer purchases at the reoﬀering
price is higher for all trade sizes over the ﬁrst few days, as one would expect if it serves as a focal
point. When one adds in the purchases by customers below the reoﬀering price, in the bottom
panel, the percentages increase markedly for the largest traders, particularly as time progresses,
and much less so for retail sized trades. Prices for small traders do not evolve as one would expect
in a classically eﬃcient, well-functioning ﬁnancial market.
To summarize, the most natural proxy for heterogeneity in the costs dealers face is transaction
size. We would expect economies of scale for dealers in intermediating trades. Were this the
only source of dispersion in prices, we would expect small traders to pay high prices and large
traders to pay lower prices when they buy newly issued municipal bonds. Similarly, trade size is a
natural proxy for diﬀerences in bargaining power. Small traders are likely to be occasional market
participants. Large traders have repeated interactions with the dealers’ sales and trading personnel.
14Again, however, this would suggest small traders pay high prices and large traders low prices.
The patterns we observe in the data are more complex than either heterogeneity in dealer costs
or customer bargaining power alone would suggest. Small customers do, on average, pay more than
large customers. But small customers also face a high level of dispersion in the prices at which
they trade, while large traders do not, suggesting heterogeneity in the information customers bring
with them to the marketplace. Large traders are more homogeneously informed and sophisticated
shoppers, because they trade frequently and incur the information gathering costs required to
bargain eﬀectively with dealers. Some small traders are similarly sophisticated, and are accordingly
able to ﬁnd attractive prices by purchasing newly issued bonds at or close to the reoﬀering price.
Others arrive uninformed, and trade at prices that can be a half year’s to a year’s worth of interest
higher than the reoﬀering price.
3.3 Agency and Managed-Account Trades
Diﬀerences in information, or in the costs of acquiring information, are one explanation for the
variation in the terms at which small investors trade. If the costs of obtaining attractive terms
are suﬃciently high because of a lack of price transparency, then we might expect institutional
mechanisms to arise allowing investors to delegate trading to others, for whom the costs of gathering
information are lower. Mutual funds are one mechanism through which small investors can trade
on institutional terms, at the cost of annual fees and ﬂexibility in structuring their own portfolio.
So–called “managed accounts,” which involve annual “wrap fees,” are another mechanism. Such
vehicles have become particularly important in the municipal market. Because of ambiguity in how
such trades are reported, and our inability to observe the wrap fees, the presence of managed
account trades in our sample may lead us to overestimate the heterogeneity in the terms of trade
for retail investors. Also, “agency trades,” in which the broker-dealer does not take a position as
a principal in the bonds, may be misleading about the costs of some trades in our sample, since
the commissions charged may not be reported. In short, some of the heterogeneity we attribute to
small investors being informed or sophisticated may be because of their trading indirectly through
informed parties, whose compensation we do not directly observe in the measured markup over the
reoﬀering prices.
15In an agency trade a broker-dealer arranges for the exchange of bonds between two customers, or
between another dealer and a customer, without taking the bonds into inventory. The broker-dealers
are compensated by commission. The two sides of the exchange will appear in the transactions
data with the same time stamp, and, unless adjusted to account for the commission, at the same
price. If the commission is not included, the buyer would appear to be getting better terms than
they are actually getting, and we might mistakenly ascribe this to the investor’s information or
superior bargaining power. There appears to be some ambiguity in whether and how the prices the
MSRB reports adjust for the commission.4
Agency trades would seem unlikely to be of great importance for new issues, since dealers are
acting as principals when they initially purchase the bonds from the issuer. A search of our data
for customer sales that match dealer purchases from customers or other dealers at the same time
or earlier on the same day in terms of par value and price produce 1,904 such transactions. Such
trades are candidates for possible agency trades not reported net of commissions. These trades
amount to only 1.3 percent of all the sales to customers in our data. Excluding them has virtually
no qualitative or quantitative eﬀect on any of our results.5 Finally, commissions advertised by
dealers who routinely act as agents are small relative to the amount of dispersion in prices we
observe.6
Trades for managed accounts are likely to be more signiﬁcant in this context. These arrange-
ments involve an intermediary, known as an “investment advisor,” who purchases bonds on behalf
4The MSRB notices available to us suggest the MSRB adjusts reported prices to reﬂect the commissions. “MSRB
Interpretive Notices: Rule G-30 Interpretive Notices,” available at http://www.msrb.org/msrb1/not table.asp,
states, “The transactions data provided by the MSRB’s Transaction Reporting System includes ‘net’ prices of dealer-
customer transactions, as well as inter-dealer and broker’s brokers’ transactions prices.” A footnote elaborates as
follows: “ ‘Net’ prices include the eﬀect of commission, mark-up, or mark-down.” In a question and answer section of
their notices, http://www.msrb.org/msrb1/TRSweb/qa630.htm question 24, “When reporting dollar prices on agency
transactions, should the eﬀect of commissions be included in the dollar price reported to the Board?” is answered
with “No. There is a separate ﬁeld for reporting the commission on agency transactions. The MSRB will include
the eﬀect of the commission in the dollar price when aggregating principal and agency transactions and reporting
price information on the public daily report.” These documents suggest the transactions prices we have are net of
commissions. An MSRB oﬃcial contacted by the authors, however, states that the dealers themselves report prices
net of commissions. Thus, the reporting procedures appear unclear, and it is possible some trades in the data are
not net of commissions.
5We have reproduced all of our tables and ﬁgures excluding potential agency trades. To illustrate the impact this
has on the results in the tables that document price dispersion, none of the percentages in Table 5 change by more
than a point. None of the percentages in the ﬁrst three panels of Table 6 change by more than a point. In the last
panel four of the reported percentages change by two points, and two by three points. Only one of the percentages
in Table 7 changes by two points, and the rest by only one point or less. In Table 8, after rounding to the nearest
percentage, only three of the numbers in the body of the table change by two points, the rest by one or less.
6For example, Fidelity’s web site gives commissions of 20 basis points on a $10,000 trade.
16of individual investors and allocates them across individual accounts. The intermediaries involved
are compensated by an annual fee, known as a “wrap fee,” which is a percentage of the assets
under management. In eﬀect, the accounts are managed much like a mutual fund, but instead of
owning shares in a large portfolio, clients retain legally separate accounts. The investment advisor
arranging a trade may not take the bonds into inventory, but instead may instruct the selling dealer
to deliver the bonds to other dealers who act as custodians for the ﬁnal customers’ accounts. The
receiving dealers are then instructed how to allocate the bonds across individual accounts. The
receiving dealer has no control over the terms of the trade, and the selling dealer may not be aware
of the identities of the ﬁnal customers.
MSRB Notice 2003-20, isssued in May of 2003 near the end of our sample, resolves the ambiguity
regarding how these trades should be recorded. In the context of an example involving a $1
million trade, it states: “With respect to transaction reporting requirements in this situation,
the Selling Dealer should report a $1 million sale to a customer. No other dealer should report
a transaction.”7 Prior to this notice, however, some of these trades might have been reported as
interdealer transactions, representing the transfer from the selling dealer to the receiving custodians,
followed by multiple smaller sales to customers, when the receiving custodians allocate the bonds
to individual accounts. All these trades would be recorded at the same price, and very close
together in time. Such reporting would lead us to overstate the heterogeneity in the terms at which
retail-level customers trade for two reasons. First, the wrap fees are not reﬂected in the recorded
transactions prices. Second, economically these are large block trades arranged by a professional
intermediary, as the MSRB’s ruling acknowledges. The receiving dealers and ﬁnal customers have
no direct control over its terms.
With regard to the unobserved fees, we note that they are not of suﬃcient magnitude to alter
our conclusion that there is a great deal of dispersion in the costs of trade for retail investors. For
example, Nuveen Investments is one of he largest providers of this service in the municipal market.
Marketing materials on their web site present historical performance of portfolios with wrap fees
varying from 75 to 125 basis points. Allocating these costs across several trades a year, it appears
that managed accounts are a cost eﬀective way for retail level investors to buy municipal bonds.
7This notice is available at http://www.msrb.org/msrb1/archive/TRSIANotice.htm.
17To evaluate the importance of managed trades for our empirical analysis, we searched our data
for examples of three or more sales to customers at the same price on the same day, preceded by
an interdealer trade at the same price, with par value greater than any of the individual trades.
This selection procedure is conservative, in that it is likely to include many trades that are not
managed account trades. Simply requiring that the preceding interdealer trade be for more than
$250,000 in par value, for example, decreases the number of trades selected by half. The search
produced 1,369 potential transactions involving 10,222 individual sales to customers, 7.2 percent
of the sales to customers in our data. We then aggregated these sales to customers, treating each
group of same-day, same-price sales as one large trade, and repeated all of our analyses.
Aggregating possible managed account sales to customers has only minor quantitative eﬀects on
our ﬁndings, and has no eﬀect on the qualitative conclusion that retail investors face considerable
price dispersion, while large traders trade at attractive terms with little price dispersion.8
3.4 Underwriter Performance on Sales at the Reoﬀering Yield
Underwriters are required by law to certify to the IRS that at least ten percent of each issue is
sold at the reoﬀering yield.9 The intent of the rule is to ensure that the yield reported to the
tax authority is economically meaningful. Our data allows us to evaluate the extent to which
underwriters are meeting the obligation.
We compute the fraction of issues with sales to customers at the reoﬀering price over the ﬁrst
sixty trading days after the issue. For 35% of the issues, all the sales to customers are at the
reoﬀering price, suggesting that it is, indeed, an economically meaningful quantity. For almost as
8To illustrate, of the 42 percentages reported in the body of Table 5, which concerns intra-day price variation,
only ﬁve of these change at all, and in each case by only a percentage point. Table 6 stratiﬁes the intra-day price
variation by trade size. Only 33 of the 96 percentages reported there change, when the possible managed account
trades are aggregated. In two cases this change is three percent, in three cases it is 2 percent, and in the remaining
cases it is only one percent. Most of the percentages reported in Table 7 rise somewhat. The managed account
trades are likely to be informed ones, leading to fewer customer buys at or below the reoﬀering price when they are
aggregated. The mass of the trades in the lower tail, however, increases much more through time for the large trades
than the small ones, as reported in the previous section. With wrap-fee trades aggregated, for example, 63 (days
3-5), 47 (days 6-10), and 30 (> 10 days) percent of the largest trades are at or below the reoﬀering price, while 31,
16, and 5 percent (respectively) are at the reoﬀering price. The comparable percentages for the trades from $10,000
to $25,000 in par value are 13, 10, and 14 percent (at or below) and 11, 7, 4 percent (at the reoﬀering price).
9Section 1.148-1(b) of the Federal Tax Regulations states the following rule for tax purposes: “Generally, the issue
price of bonds that are publicly oﬀered is the ﬁrst price at which a substantial amount of the bonds is sold to the
public. Ten percent is a substantial amount. The public does not include bond houses, brokers, or similar persons or
organizations acting in the capacity of underwriters or wholesalers.”
18many issues, 25%, there are no sales to customers at all at the reoﬀering price over the ﬁrst sixty
days, and for 15% of the issues there are none at or below the reoﬀering price.
Table 8 provides some evidence on the robustness of the ﬁnding. We report several diﬀerent
measures of the sales to customer, at or below the reoﬀering price (“Discount Sales”), as a fraction
of the total issue. For example, we compute the total par value of sales below the reoﬀering price
over the ﬁrst sixty days of trading. We also consider all the sales to either customers or other
dealers that exhaust the dealers’ initial inventory in the bond; and the last sales in time, within the
ﬁrst sixty days, that aggregate to the size of the issue. The body of the table reports the percentage
of issues where the fraction of par value sold, computed using the diﬀerent measures, falls in the
range on the left hand side.
By all the measures, a substantial fraction of the issues show less than the required 10% of the
issue being sold at or below the reoﬀering price. Depending on the measure used, between 5.4%
and 15.9% of issues sell none of the issue at or below the reoﬀering price. If we consider issues
selling less than the required 10% at or below the reoﬀering price, these percentages rise: 6.1% to
19.1% depending on the measure used. When we consider entire deals, however, these percentages
are much lower.
The opaque and decentralized nature of the market through which municipal bonds are traded
makes the 10% requirement diﬃcult for the regulatory and tax authorities to monitor and enforce.
It appears that in many cases in our sample, the requirement is simply ignored.
4 A Mixture Model
The behavior evident in Figure 3 suggests dealer markups are drawn from two distributions. Some
investors trade at or close to the reoﬀering price, while simultaneously other investors are buying
bonds at a diﬀuse set of prices that can be very far from the reoﬀering price. From Figure 4 and
Table 6 it is apparent that large buyers are more homogeneous in the terms of trade they receive,
suggesting they are more consistently informed.
We report estimates from a mixture model for the markups investors pay when they purchase
newly issued municipal bonds. The empirical analysis provides new insights into the value of non-
fundamental pricing information and into the determinants of underpricing in municipal bonds.
194.1 Model
The market for new municipal bond issues is relatively opaque. Information about upcoming issues
is readily available to institutional investors but not to typical retail investors. Yet there are ways
retail investors can learn about new issues, for example through trade publications such as The
Bond Buyer or through ﬁnancial advisors. An investor’s information depends in part on exogenous
or predetermined factors such as chance or word-of-mouth advertising, and in part endogenously on
the trade-oﬀ between the costs and beneﬁts of acquiring information. We model the determinants
and the eﬀects of being informed about a new bond issue. The information we model is not direct
news about the cash ﬂows of the bond nor the pricing kernel. Instead, the information is about the
underwriter’s pricing of the new issue.




i = wiδ + ui, (1)
where wi is a vector of conditioning variables, δ is a parameter vector, and ui is an error term
observed by the investor but not the econometrician. Investor i becomes informed about the issue
price if and only if z∗
i ≥ 0. We do not observe z∗
i , but we do observe wi and the price the investor
pays for the bond.
The model categorizes individual transactions as likely to be “informed” or “uninformed” on
the basis of observable characteristics of the trade. Informed investors should know where to go to
obtain information at relatively low cost. We cannot observe the identity of individual traders and
so we cannot model such heterogeneity in costs directly. It is subsumed in the error terms in the
choice equation (1).
An investor who is uninformed about the reoﬀering price for a new bond issue is willing to pay
the percentage markup yU of
yUi = xiβ + Ui, (2)
with xi a vector of conditioning variables, β a parameter vector, and Ui an error term. An investor
who is informed about the underwriter’s pricing of the bond issue is willing to pay the percentage
20markup yI of
yIi = xiγ + Ii, (3)
with xi a vector of conditioning variables, γ a parameter vector, and Ii an error term. We expect
the uncertainty about the percent markup to be lower when the investor is informed than when
the investor is uninformed:
σI < σU. (4)
In the empirical implementation, we use condition (4) to identify the informed versus uninformed
distributions from which the observed transactions are drawn.
Observed values of yi—deﬁned as the relative markup over the reoﬀering price—come from one
of two distributions. We do not directly observe which distribution produced any given observation.
The observed distribution of markups is, therefore, a mixture of the markup equations (2) and (3).















The investor takes the markup into account when deciding whether to become informed about
an upcoming bond issue or not. As a consequence, ui and Ui are correlated, and ui and Ii are
correlated. Denote the correlation between ui and Ui as ρU and the correlation between ui and Ii
as ρI.
To estimate the model, we assume that the error terms are drawn independently and identically























































Here we have normalized the variance of the error term in equation (1), ui, to one.
Let Φ denote the cumulative standard normal distribution, and φ the standard normal density.
Investor i is informed if and only if z∗
i ≥ 0, so that
Pr(Informedi|wi) = Pr(z∗
i ≥ 0|wi)
= Pr(ui ≥ −wiδ|wi)
= Φ(wiδ), (8)
and
Pr(Uninformedi|wi) = 1 − Φ(wiδ). (9)
Using equation (3),
E(yi|Informedi,wi,xi) = xiγ + E(Ii|z∗
i ≥ 0). (10)






























(1 − Φ(wiδ)). (14)
We estimate equation (14) as a switching regression using the EM algorithm.10
4.2 Results
Table 9 describes the explanatory variables used in the estimation. Table 10 summarizes the
coeﬃcient estimates for the markup equation. The ﬁrst set of columns in the body of Table 10
contains estimation results from a linear regression of percent markups over reoﬀering price against
observed characteristics of the bond and trade, using the pooled sample of all sales transactions
during the ﬁrst ﬁve days of trading. Results, reported below, are very similar over longer horizons
and for market-adjusted markups.
The OLS estimates reported in the ﬁrst column show that traders with large orders pay less
than traders with small orders. Consistent with the descriptive analysis, the expected markup on
an average transaction increases by 19 basis points per day starting with the ﬁrst day of trading.
When-issued trades, i.e., transactions that occur before the settlement date of the issue, are priced
four basis points cheaper on average than ordinary trades. Markups on competitive oﬀers are, on
average, ten basis points lower than in negotiated deals.
The remaining columns in the body of Table 10 report coeﬃcient estimates from the mixture
model. The regressors—xi in equations (2) and (3)—are de-meaned using the unconditional sample
means. Sales to customers that appear to be agency trades are excluded. Sales that we identify
as possible trades for managed accounts are included in disaggregated form, but we include an
indicator for such trades as a conditioning variable.
The coeﬃcients indicate that there are two pricing regimes. There is little variation in transac-
tion prices for informed investors; most coeﬃcient estimates are close to zero. The higher intercept
term indicates that uninformed buyers pay higher prices on average (135 basis points). The eco-
nomically large values for the other coeﬃcients shows there is substantial variation in the prices
paid by uninformed investors. Even for uninformed buyers, large transactions still occur at more
10See Hartley (1978) for details on the implementation of the iterative estimator.
23favorable prices, and when-issued trades are priced at nine basis points below ordinary trades. We
would expect this, because whether buyers are well informed or not, there are surely returns to
scale in processing trades and dealers will sacriﬁce proﬁts to avoid holding bonds in inventory.
Higher rated bonds transact, in general, at more favorable prices for uninformed investors. The
negative coeﬃcient on days since trading begins for both types suggests the upward trend in prices
is explained mostly by time-series variation in the composition of investor types.
Curiously, premium bonds trade at yields well above those of bonds with reoﬀering price below
par. The price diﬀerence is about half a percent. Underwriters and brokers argue that retail
investors are behaviorally averse to buying bonds at a premium, and underwriters accordingly
use this device to signal that an issue is targeted to institutional investors. Trades identiﬁed as
possible wrap-fee trades involve lower markups over all, as we would expect if they are carried
out by sophisticated intermediaries. Since our mechanism for identifying wrap-free trades likely
includes many trades that are not for managed accounts as well, and since the classiﬁcation of
trades as informed and uninformed is noisy, the wrap fees variable continues to have explanatory
power within each regime.
Table 11 summarizes the coeﬃcient estimates for the investors’ decisions to become informed
or not, equation (1). The coeﬃcient on trade size shows that large buyers are more likely to
be informed about the bond issue and the reoﬀering price. We would expect that the repeated
nature of the interactions with intermediaries and their access to infrastructure would allow them
to acquire information at relatively low cost. Further, the mix of informed and uninformed investors
is changing over time, as time elapsed since issuance decreases the probability of being informed.
Informed investors buy soon after issuance and are therefore the more likely counter-party early
on. If a trade is identiﬁed as a possible wrap-fee trade, it is more likely to be an informed trade,
as we would expect.
Longer maturity bonds are more likely to be bought by uninformed investors. Lower rated
bonds see more informed trading than prime bonds. First-time issuers also attract more informed
investors, but so do frequent issuers. This may be because ﬁrst-time issuers lack the visibility
to attract broad and unsophisticated retail participation. Frequent issuers, while attracting retail
investors, also have lower costs of becoming informed about upcoming issues for the traders.
24In Table 12 we report the results from estimating the mixture model over a longer time horizon
and using an alternative deﬁnition of the dependent variable. We use all transactions during the
ﬁrst sixty days, and we adjust the markups for market-wide returns. We deﬁne the market-adjusted
markup used in Table 12 as the diﬀerence between the transaction price and the reoﬀering price,
as a percentage of the reoﬀering price (i.e., the gross markup), minus the return on a broad-based
maturity-matched municipal bond index over the same time period. The coeﬃcient estimates are
similar to the ones reported in Tables 10 and 11, and they convey the same intuition. Informed
investors transact at quite more favorable prices than uninformed investors.
One variable that changes sign in the choice equation with the longer time period—60 rather
than 5 days—is issue frequency. The sign switch suggests that informed trading for frequent
issuers occurs entirely in the ﬁrst few days. When an issuer comes to the market more frequently,
sophisticated investors anticipate the issues.
4.3 Money Left on Table by Uninformed Investors
How economically signiﬁcant is the money left on the table by uninformed investors to the broker–
dealers? The answer provides insights into the incentives and trade-oﬀs faced by the broker–dealers
and underwriters in the underwriting process and into the competitiveness of the industry. The
answer may also help explain the reluctance of the bond underwriters to introduce more pre-trade
transparency in the muni market.
We use our parameter estimates to classify each transaction into either the Informed or Unin-
formed regime. We also use our parameter estimates to form estimates of the expectation of the
diﬀerence between the beneﬁt and cost of learning about the new issue in equation (1), conditional
on the observed markup and the conditioning variables. The transaction is classiﬁed as coming
from the Informed regime if the expected beneﬁt is greater than the cost, and classiﬁed as coming
from the Uninformed regime otherwise:
Informedi = 1 ⇔ E(z∗
i |yi,wi,xi) ≥ 0,
Uninformedi = 1 ⇔ E(z∗
i |yi,wi,xi) < 0. (15)
25The diﬀerence in the expected markup between an informed investors and an uninformed in-
vestor is:









max{E(yUi − yIi|Uninformedi,wi,xi),0}, if Uninformedi = 1,
0, else.
(17)
We form estimates of ∆i by plugging our parameter estimates into equation (17). Let ˆ ∆i denote
the resulting estimates.11
To obtain a cumulative measure we aggregate the estimates of ˆ ∆i across all sales transactions
i in a given bond issue j, and then across all issues in a deal. For a given deal,






Table 13 shows statistics for the money earned by underwriters from uninformed investors across
all bond deals in the sample. On the ﬁrst two rows we report statistics for the conditional markup
diﬀerence, ∆i. In the third row we aggregate all sales transactions in a given issue, and in rows
4-6 we aggregate amounts earned in a given deal. The last lines give the underwriter discount as a
percent of par value per deal. The money left by uninformed investors is a signiﬁcant fraction of
overall expected proﬁts to the broker-dealers and underwriters. Total expected proﬁts are deﬁned as
the sum of the underwriter fees, and the money left on the table. As with the markups in general,
the distribution of money left on the table is highly skewed. Figure 6 plots the cross-sectional
distribution. More than two thirds of all bond deals generate at least 5% of their expected proﬁts
from trading proﬁts with uninformed investors, about half of the deals generate 5-50% of proﬁts
with uninformed investors, while for a small fraction of deals the trading proﬁts with uninformed
traders amounts to more than 50% of proﬁts.
11We also compute ˆ ∆i without truncating at zero. The results are similar to the ones computed using the truncation.
265 Conclusions
The behavior of prices for newly issued securities are informative about the role of ﬁnancial inter-
mediaries in the security issuance process, the situations in which they can exercise market power,
the nature of the costs they face, and the eﬃciency with which capital is provided to those who
demand it.
In contrast to trading venues with more transparency such as equity markets, the market for
municipal bonds exhibits high levels of price dispersion, even within trade size categories. Perhaps
some smaller investors face high search or information acquisition costs. Alternatively, behavioral
considerations may suggest reasons that some investors trade at such unattractive terms.
Policy makers can control the degree of transparency in securities markets. Indeed, the post-
trade transparency in the municipal market has, through changes mandated by the MSRB, increased
dramatically. Prices are now available on-line within ﬁfteen minutes of a trade. The consequences
that this will have for small investors, institutional investors, issuers, and broker-dealers is an open
theoretical and empirical question.
Some caveats should be kept in mind before conﬁdently attributing the high costs of trade
some investors bear directly to the transparency of the trading venue. First, the trading venue
and trading costs are jointly endogenous outcomes. There may simply be much less demand by
retail investors for liquidity in municipals bonds than in equities. Second, intermediaries such as
mutual funds and investment advisors provide means through which small investors can circumvent
the high costs of trading small quantities, or the information acquisition costs associated with
such trading. The measures our mixed-distribution model provides of the costs of trading as an
uninformed investor, however, suggest that the losses such investors actually incur are economically
meaningful, especially for issues with high levels of retail participation. The willingness of some
investors to bear these costs suggests they ascribe a high value to the freedom to directly control
the maturity, tax-exposure, and credit risk of their portfolios.
Our results suggest that both issuers and investors could beneﬁt from mechanisms that give
retail investors more direct, low cost access to the primary bond market through participation in the
oﬀering. Underwriter spreads and fees are a relatively transparent cost to the issuer, and we would
expect underwriters to compete vigorously for new business on this dimension. The proﬁts earned
27in distributing the bonds to smaller investors, on the other hand, are more diﬃcult for issuers to
evaluate because of the opacity of the market in which municipal bonds trade. Currently, because
underwriter spreads are relatively low in the primary market, retail brokers have little incentive to
ﬁll customers’ orders by participating directly in the bond oﬀering. Retail investors hold roughly
35% of municipal bonds outstanding. Broker-dealers and large institutions in the market seem
unlikely to support the development of such mechanisms, since this will eliminate what appears to
be an important, and relatively opaque, source of proﬁts to them.
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29Appendix A Sample Construction
The two main data sources are the Primuni sample of municipal bond deals and the MSRB data-
base of all secondary market transactions. We have applied a sequence of simple rule-based ﬁlters
to identify outliers and ﬁx clerical errors in both datasets. In the following we describe each of the
ﬁlters in the order in which they have been applied, and we summarize how many transactions,
issues, and deals were aﬀected by the corresponding ﬁlters. We start by screening the Primuni sam-
ple of new issues, and then we check for consistency in the MSRB sample of customer transactions.
The ﬁlters we have applied address the most common problems in the data.
Primuni New Issues Sample: First, we check for duplicate deals and CUSIPs, and eliminate
all duplicates. Next, we search for missing, erroneous, and incomplete CUSIP numbers, reoﬀering
prices, and issue sizes, respectively. We eliminate the corresponding bond from the sample if any
of these items are missing. If there are obvious errors such as misplaced decimal points in the
reoﬀering price, the reoﬀering yield, or the coupon rate, we correct the data. We double-check all
other ﬁelds for consistency and formatting errors.
MSRB Secondary Market Transactions: First, we erase all dealer purchases from cus-
tomers recorded before the ﬁrst recorded sales transaction. This ﬁlter captures initial purchases
from the issuer that are reported in the MSRB database with a wrong time stamp or in error. The
ﬁrst ﬁlter removes a total of 2,091 transactions.
Second, we determine the aggregate dealer inventory at each point in time. We individually look
at all bonds with a calculated dealer inventory during the ﬁrst sixty trading days after issuance that
exceeds the size of the issue12, and at all bonds with negative d ealer inventory. If the maximum
inventory is larger than the issue, we erase a single dealer purchase from the sample if at least one
of following two criteria is satisﬁed:
• The par amount of the purchase is equal in magnitude to the remaining aggregate dealer
12For the screening we adjust the issue size number in the Primuni sample if the hand-collected size of the issue is
not consistent with the MSRB transactions in the following way. We merge the new issues data with the corresponding
secondary market transactions in the MSRB database. We then compare the hand-collected issue size to the par
amounts associated with all transactions in the MSRB database. We set the issue size to the par amount of the
largest secondary market transaction, if the recorded size is less than the largest transaction and the following two
additional conditions are satisﬁed: First, the original issue size leads to an aggregate dealer inventory after sixty
trading days that is not nil and, second, the aggregate dealer inventory falls within the ﬁrst sixty trading days from
issuance by a par amount exactly equal in magnitude to the largest transaction. We adjust the issue size only if all
three of the above conditions hold.
30inventory after sixty trading days, and after deletion the dealer inventory does not exceed the
size of the issue at any point in time.
• The par amount is equal to the issue size, the purchase transaction would increase the current
dealer inventory to more than the par size of the issue, and the aggregate dealer inventory
after sixty trading days would be above the original issue size. For these bonds it is likely
that tickets on sales transactions are missing from the MSRB database.
The second ﬁlter eliminates 209 transactions.
Third, we determine the minimum dealer inventory over the ﬁrst sixty trading days and check
all bonds with a negative dealer inventory. We identify all sales transactions that are immediately
followed (in the order transactions appear in the MSRB database) by another sales transaction with
the same par amount, time stamp, and price (type I), same par amount and time stamp (type II),
or with the same par amount, trade date and with negative dealer inventory immediately after the
transaction (type III). We delete the ﬁrst of the two sales transactions if the minimum aggregate
dealer inventory before deletion (measured during the ﬁrst sixty trading days) is negative and after
deletion it is exactly zero. These are likely transactions that were entered repeatedly to correct the
previously reported transaction price, in error, or for some other reason. The third ﬁlter eliminates
173 transactions.
Forth, we eliminate the last sales transaction that occurs before the aggregate dealer inventory
turns negative for the ﬁrst time and that matches the negative inventory amount after sixty trading
days. In this case it is likely that data on purchase transactions is missing from the MSRB database.
The fourth ﬁlter eliminates 804 transactions.
Fifth, we erase the sales transaction with the smallest par amount that leads to a non-negative
minimum dealer inventory while keeping the dealer inventory bounded above by the issue size
during the ﬁrst sixty trading days after issuance. If there is more than one transaction satisfying
the criteria, we pick the last. The ﬁfth ﬁlter eliminates 472 transactions.
Deals and Bond Issues Eliminated: In the last step we eliminate all bonds in which
transactions take place at a par amount larger than the adjusted issue size. We also erase all bonds
that after ﬁltering the transactions history remain to have a maximum dealer inventory greater
than their issue size, or a minimum dealer inventory below zero or equal to the size of the issue.
31If there are a number of irregularities for diﬀerent bonds of the same deal, we eliminate the entire
deal. The last step eliminates 1,494 bonds.
After data cleaning a total of 1,000 out of 1,048 deals remain in the sample, and 12,493 out of
13,987 individual bond issues remain in the sample.
32Table 1: Sample Selection.
The table describes the sample’s characteristics. The ﬁrst two columns in the body of the table list
the characteristics of the bonds appearing in our sample falling into the category in question. The
second set of columns gives the characteristics in the population of new issues during the sample
period. The ﬁrst number in each column is the cross-sectional mean, and the number in parenthesis
is the cross-sectional median. Size is proxied by net sales to customers during the ﬁrst sixty days
if they exceed the maximum transaction size. Maturity, coupon, callability, and taxable status are
size-weighted averages per deal. The percentages for the diﬀerent ratings categories are conditional
on a rating being available. Data on the ten states with the highest proportion of millionaires is
from the Statistics of Income Bulletin, Winter 2002. No-Tax States are states with no state income
tax. In these states bonds issued either in-state or out-of-state are tax exempt at the state level.
Tax States are states where both in-state and out-of-state issuers are taxable.
Sample Market
Issues Deals Issues Deals
Par Size (proxy) 2.2 (0.6) 27.2 (9.6) 2.5 (0.4) 24.2 (5.7)
Volume (in million $) 4.3 (1.0) 53.8 (17.9) 5.4 (0.7) 52.2 (9.9)
Sales to Customers 2.3 (0.6) 29.5 (10.0) 3.1 (0.4) 29.7 (6.0)
Purchases from Customers 0.4 (0.0) 5.4 (0.6) 1.0 (0.0) 9.4 (0.1)
Interdealer Transactions 1.5 (0.2) 19.0 (5.5) 1.3 (0.1) 13.1 (0.5)
Transactions 17.3 (6.0) 215.7 (97.5) 13.8 (4.0) 134.0 (29.0)
Sales to Customers 11.3 (4.0) 162.3 (65.5) 10.2 (3.0) 98.8 (20.0)
Purchases from Customers 0.6 (0.0) 7.7 (2.0) 0.6 (0.0) 6.0 (1.0)
Interdealer Transactions 3.7 (1.0) 45.8 (23.0) 3.0 (1.0) 29.2 (3.0)
Maturity 9.7 (8.9) 11.9 (11.4) 9.7 (8.5) 11.5 (10.0)
Coupon 4.7 (4.8) 4.7 (4.8) 4.4 (4.5) 4.1 (4.3)
Rating
AAA 71.5% 76.7% 73.8% 77.5%
AA 20.6% 19.8% 19.4% 19.6%
A-BBB 7.4% 6.0% 6.5% 7.0%
BB-D 0.4% 0.4% 0.3% 0.3%
Bond Type/ Issuer Type
Callable Bond 33.6% 41.5% 37.6% 43.4%
Taxable Bond 0.8% 1.8% 2.4% 3.2%
Development Revenue Bond 0.7% 0.9% 0.7% 2.1%
Pollution Revenue Bond 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.4%
Certiﬁcate of Participation 2.5% 2.5% 2.9% 2.5%
Tax Revenue Bond 2.1% 2.1% 3.1% 2.2%
School District Issuer 36.3% 37.2% 23.7% 18.2%
Health Care Issuer 2.2% 3.4% 2.2% 3.0%
Transportation Issuer 2.8% 3.0% 2.8% 2.6%
Utility Issuer 10.0% 9.2% 10.7% 8.9%
State of Issuance
No-Tax States 16.3% 15.7% 18.2% 15.4%
Tax States 7.7% 9.2% 11.9% 13.5%
U.S. Territories 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.3%
Ten Most-Populated States 55.0% 55.8% 49.2% 47.3%
Ten Most-Millionaires States 20.9% 21.0% 23.6% 23.4%
Top 3 States PA (16.3%) PA (18.7%) TX (9.1%) CA (7.2%)
TX (7.6%) TX (6.7%) CA (8.8%) NY (6.9%)
CA (6.5%) CA (5.4%) NY (7.0%) TX (6.5%)
33Table 2: Patterns of Trade in Filtered Sample.
The table reports aggregate summary statistics for the MSRB transactions data associated with the
Primuni sample of new issues after application of the various ﬁlters. Summary statistics are reported
separately for transactions constituting a sale from a registered broker-dealer to a customer, a dealer
purchase from a customer, and a transaction between dealers. In reporting the transaction size, we
compute median transaction size per bond measured in thousand $. Total volume is the cumulative
dollar amount of all transactions of the given type during the ﬁrst sixty days.
All Sales to Purchases from Interdealer
Transactions Customers Customers Transactions
No. of Transactions (in thousands) 190.3 141.3 5.4 43.6
Transaction Size (in thousand $) 49.9 30.0 163.4 156.6
Total Volume (in billion $) 50.5 28.8 3.7 18.0
34Table 3: Transactions and Volume per Issue.
The table reports summary statistics for the cross-section of new bond issues. The ﬁrst row in
each panel reports the fraction of issues with transactions during the ﬁrst sixty business days after
issuance. The issuance date is deﬁned as the earliest date on which transactions are reported in
the MSRB database and as the settlement date if no trades are recorded before then. The ﬁrst
day trades are recorded typically precedes the settlement date and diﬀers from the dated date.
The statistics of the cross-sectional distribution reported in the remaining rows in each panel are
conditional on occurrence of transactions of the given type for the given bond issue. In reporting
the transaction size, we compute median transaction size across all trades measured in thousand $.




Issues with Transactions 100%
Number of Transactions 4 11 39
Transaction Size (in thousand $) 81 474 1,629
Total Volume (in thousand $) 594 2,309 9,402
Purchases from Customers
Issues with Transactions 17%
Number of Transactions 1 3 6
Transaction Size (in thousand $) 250 798 1,847
Total Volume (in thousand $) 425 1,754 4,865
Interdealer Transactions
Issues with Transactions 66%
Number of Transactions 2 5 10
Transaction Size (in thousand $) 158 370 1,300
Total Volume (in thousand $) 515 2,177 7,342
35Table 4: Transactions per Issue and Day since Issuance.
The table reports summary statistics for the transactions associated with a given bond issue for each
day since issuance. The ﬁrst column in the body of the table reports the fraction of bond issues with
transactions of the given type on the given day. The statistics for the cross-sectional distribution
reported in the remaining columns are cross-sectional averages conditional on a transaction of the
given type occurring in a bond issue on the given day.
(1) Cross-Sectional Mean Conditional on (1) Issue-Days with Transactions
Issue-Days with Daily Turnover Daily Volume Number of Transaction Size
Day Transactions (% of Issue Size) (in thousand $) Transactions (in thousand $)
Sales to Customers
All 6% 27% 614 3 243
1 86% 73% 1,725 4 602
2 31% 30% 625 5 199
3 − 5 19% 18% 297 3 131
6 − 10 12% 12% 230 3 114
> 10 3% 9% 222 2 133
Purchases from Customers
All 0% 28% 1,084 2 852
1 4% 41% 993 2 593
2 2% 34% 977 2 614
3 − 5 1% 21% 918 2 777
6 − 10 1% 27% 1,228 2 1,000
> 10 0% 25% 1,128 1 941
Interdealer Transactions
All 3% 44% 854 2 346
1 54% 76% 1,216 2 462
2 13% 45% 1,120 3 352
3 − 5 8% 34% 759 2 319
6 − 10 5% 29% 599 2 262






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































37Table 6: Intraday Variation in Markups on Sales to Customers per Issue, by Transaction Size and
Day since Issuance.
The table reports measures of the intraday variation in transaction prices on sales to customers
across diﬀerent bond issues. The ﬁrst column in the body of the table shows the number of issues
with multiple sales of a ﬁxed number of bonds, given in each panel. The transaction sizes chosen are
the most frequent ones. The second column in the body provides the number of sales transactions
by day since issuance given multiple sales of the same number of bonds occur. The remaining
columns characterize the cross-sectional distribution, by day and transaction size, of the intraday
range in gross markups. The numbers reported are conditional on multiple sales of the same size
category occurring.
(1) Intraday Markup Range
Day Issue-Days with Number of (measured in basis points, % of (1))
Multiple Sales Transactions No Variation [1,50) [50,100) [100,∞)
Transaction Size = 10k
All 3,109 13,636 57% 10% 13% 21%
1 478 2,908 78% 5% 5% 12%
2 332 2,297 64% 8% 11% 17%
3 − 5 630 2,594 51% 11% 17% 21%
6 − 10 577 2,246 53% 10% 12% 24%
> 10 1,092 3,591 50% 11% 14% 25%
Transaction Size = 25k
All 2,999 10,145 58% 13% 12% 17%
1 772 2,936 80% 8% 4% 7%
2 358 1,810 55% 14% 9% 22%
3 − 5 552 1,679 51% 18% 17% 14%
6 − 10 468 1,374 47% 16% 17% 20%
> 10 849 2,346 50% 12% 13% 24%
Transaction Size = 50k
All 2,748 8,531 60% 14% 11% 15%
1 960 3,271 80% 9% 5% 6%
2 368 1,556 58% 14% 13% 15%
3 − 5 449 1,198 45% 19% 17% 19%
6 − 10 361 936 44% 20% 16% 19%
> 10 610 1,570 48% 15% 14% 23%
Transaction Size ≥ 250k
All 2,365 8,436 78% 14% 4% 4%
1 1,707 6,328 86% 10% 3% 2%
2 210 785 65% 19% 8% 9%
3 − 5 149 415 48% 36% 8% 7%
6 − 10 99 373 59% 27% 5% 9%











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































40Table 9: Deﬁnitions of the Explanatory Variables
Table 9 describes the conditioning variables. More detailed information on the various types of
municipal bond securities can be found at http://www.msrb.org.
Variable Description
Reoﬀering Price Price set by the underwriter at which newly issued securities are oﬀered for sale
to the public.
Markup Price at which transaction between dealer and customer takes place,
minus reoﬀering price and over reoﬀering price.
Winsorized at 0.5% and 99.5% and measured in basis points.
Par Par value of the transaction. Measured in millions of dollars.
No. of Days since Issuance Number of business days since the ﬁrst day of trade in the new issue.
Wrap-Fee Trade Trade occurs as part of a managed account trade through an intermediary
compensated by a commission.
When-Issued Trade Trade occurs during the “when, as and if issued” period, which spans from
the original date of the sale by the issuer to the delivery of the securities to,
and payment by, the underwriter. Sales made during this period are subject
to issuance of the securities.
Fraction of Issue Sold Issue size minus aggregate dealer inventory over issue size.
Issued at Premium Reoﬀering price of the new municipal security at its original issuance exceeds
its par value. The amount of original issue premium received by the issuer
in a primary oﬀering is generally treated as proceeds of the issue.
Issue Size Natural logarithm of the total par value of the bond.
Coupon Coupon rate of the bond. If missing the value is imputed based on reported
values for price, yield, maturity, call feature, call date. Measured in percent.
Maturity Years between date of transaction and maturity of the bond.
Callable Bond Issuer is permitted or required to redeem the bond between the transaction
date and maturity.
Taxable Bond Bond is not tax exempt.
Rating Available Bond issue is rated and the rating at issuance is available to us.
Rating Average bond rating assigned by S&P and Moody’s. Coded on the scale:
1=AAA, 2=AA, 3=A, 4=BBB, 5=BB, 6=B.
Competitive Oﬀer The underwriting of the deal is through public sale. In contrast to a negotiated
sale, underwriters submit purchase proposals and the securities are awarded
to the underwriting syndicate presenting the best bid.
Deal Size Natural logarithm of the total par value of all bond issues in a deal. There are
between 10 and 30 issues with diﬀerent maturity, coupon, etc. in a typical deal.
No. of Bond Issues Total number of bond issues in the deal.
Underwriter’s Discount Spread between the underwriter’s purchase price of the entire bond deal
from the issuer and the reoﬀering price.
First-Time Issuer Bond issuer has no trades in bonds issued before the issue date of the deal
under consideration.
Issue Frequency Average number of bond deals per year between the ﬁrst issue date of all traded
bonds and the issue date of the deal under consideration. Winsorized at 99%.
Development Revenue Bond Industrial development revenue bond, where the proceeds are loaned directly
to private users to ﬁnance facilities.
Pollution Revenue Bond Private activity bond issued by a state or local authority and used to ﬁnance
the acquisition of pollution control equipment by a corporation.
Certiﬁcate of Participation Revenue bond evidencing a pro rata share in a speciﬁc pledged revenue stream,
usually lease payments by the issuer that are subject to annual appropriation.
Tax Revenue Bond Bond backed directly by tax revenues from a speciﬁc source.
Tobacco Settlement Bond Tobacco settlement asset-backed bonds.
School District Issuer Issuer is a school district.
Health Care Issuer Issuer is a health care provider.
Transportation Issuer Issuer is a transportation authority.
Utility Issuer Issuer is a public utility.
41Table 10: Estimation Results for Mixture Model: Markup Equation
Table 10 summarizes estimation results for the coeﬃcients in the markup equation. The ﬁrst
column reports OLS estimates from a pooled regression. The coeﬃcients in the remaining two
columns contain the estimated coeﬃcients on the markup determinants for the Informed and the
Uninformed regime. The dependent variable is the actual markup over the reoﬀering price paid
by investors. All conditioning variables, except for the Mill’s ratio, are demeaned. The sample
contains all sales to investors during the ﬁrst ﬁve days after issuance. Possible agency trades are
excluded and possible trades for managed accounts are disaggregated.
Pooled Informed Uninformed
Transactions Regime Regime
Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat
Constant 57.61 (226.83) −0.02 (−3.36) 135.36 (57.74)
1/Par 0.30 (53.17) −0.00 (−2.95) 0.16 (17.66)
No. of Days since Issuance 18.93 (83.38) −0.04 (−12.13) −5.49 (−7.91)
Wrap-Fee Trade −51.41 (−57.87) 0.04 (7.68) −24.65 (−5.19)
When-Issued Trade −4.09 (−3.64) −0.04 (−8.07) −8.59 (−3.44)
Fraction of Issue Sold 1.59 (1.71) 0.01 (3.02) 8.78 (5.51)
Issued at Premium −4.91 (−6.88) −0.23 (−71.40) −46.21 (−34.18)
Issue Size 1.13 (3.53) −0.01 (−9.35) 0.28 (0.58)
Coupon −21.42 (−49.02) 0.01 (5.13) −12.14 (−13.68)
Maturity 7.29 (118.49) −0.00 (−9.35) 7.06 (59.63)
Callable Bond −25.06 (−31.66) 0.01 (3.73) −17.70 (−13.27)
Taxable Bond 31.86 (7.40) −0.02 (−0.75) −26.75 (−4.67)
Rating Available 1.31 (1.16) −0.02 (−2.97) −48.42 (−25.93)
Rating (1=AAA, 2=AA, etc.) −6.48 (−17.35) −0.02 (−12.31) 10.65 (15.77)
Competitive Oﬀer −9.69 (−11.17) −0.06 (−12.53) −17.08 (−13.76)
Deal Size 3.39 (9.10) 0.00 (2.42) 1.37 (2.43)
No. of Bond Issues −0.58 (−13.21) −0.00 (−3.04) −0.52 (−7.25)
Development Revenue Bond −19.84 (−5.73) 0.04 (3.49) −18.94 (−3.64)
Pollution Revenue Bond 7.32 (2.44) −0.12 (−8.04) −22.41 (−4.95)
Certiﬁcate of Participation −9.41 (−6.61) 0.03 (4.50) −1.22 (−0.54)
Tax Revenue Bond 10.08 (5.27) −0.04 (−6.16) −7.34 (−2.78)
Tobacco Settlement Bond −8.24 (−4.59) −0.06 (−11.64) −4.30 (−1.12)
School District Issuer 0.96 (1.36) 0.02 (5.44) −10.65 (−9.66)
Health Care Issuer 20.52 (17.16) 0.12 (16.42) 4.75 (2.56)
Transportation Issuer 10.37 (9.27) 0.02 (4.87) −9.96 (−6.01)
Utility Issuer −2.13 (−2.17) −0.01 (−2.35) −5.65 (−3.61)
Mill’s Ratio (ρσ) − − 0.09 (10.41) 45.79 (17.97)
√
MSE (σ) 74.14 0.24 78.28
R2 48.1% 17.6% 54.0%
Observations 80,684 80,684
42Table 11: Estimation Results for Mixture Model: Choice Equation
Table 11 summarizes estimation results for the coeﬃcients in the switching equation. The dependent
variable is the likelihood that the transaction is with an informed investor. The sample contains





No. of Days since Issuance −0.57 (−276.39)
Wrap-Fee Trade 1.43 (176.61)
When-Issued Trade −0.05 (−4.62)
Fraction of Issue Sold 0.18 (21.68)
Issued at Premium −0.39 (−59.05)
Issue Size −0.05 (−16.83)
Coupon 0.16 (38.32)
Maturity −0.05 (−96.82)
Callable Bond 0.01 (1.95)
Taxable Bond −0.97 (−24.67)
Rating Available −0.27 (−24.63)
Rating (1=AAA, 2=AA, etc.) 0.19 (55.05)
Competitive Oﬀer −0.04 (−3.70)
Deal Size 0.02 (5.34)
No. of Bond Issues 0.01 (17.40)
Development Revenue Bond 0.22 (7.03)
Pollution Revenue Bond −0.10 (−3.79)
Certiﬁcate of Participation 0.11 (8.23)
Tax Revenue Bond −0.37 (−21.23)
Tobacco Settlement Bond −0.17 (−9.31)
School District Issuer −0.15 (−23.56)
Health Care Issuer −0.19 (−17.77)
Transportation Issuer −0.33 (−32.27)
Utility Issuer 0.02 (2.28)
First-Time Issuer 0.31 (35.14)
Issue Frequency 0.08 (30.82)





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































44Table 13: Money Left on Table
Table 13 provides summary statistics for the money left on the table by uninformed investors.
Money left on the table is deﬁned in equation (18). Total proﬁts to the underwriting syndicate are
deﬁned as the sum of the underwriter fees and the money left on the table.
Quartiles
Mean S.D. 1st 2nd 3rd Obs.
Days 1-5
Money Left on Table:
by Transaction (in Basis Points) 128.4 82.0 66.8 117.1 187.2 36,585
by Transaction (in thousand $) 1.0 7.2 0.1 0.3 0.6 36,585
by Issue (in thousand $) 3.0 33.2 0.0 0.0 1.0 12,421
by Deal (in thousand $) 36.8 152.6 1.6 9.9 28.6 1,000
by Deal (% of Total Par ∗100) 14.6 19.3 1.9 8.4 19.6 1,000
by Deal (% of Total Proﬁt) 14.3 14.4 2.7 9.9 21.9 823
Days 1-60
Money Left on Table:
by Transaction (in Basis Points) 97.4 80.1 33.4 78.6 150.3 113,057
by Transaction (in thousand $) 0.9 7.9 0.1 0.2 0.4 113,057
by Issue (in thousand $) 7.9 67.4 0.0 0.2 2.2 12,421
by Deal (in thousand $) 97.9 340.7 4.0 18.6 66.2 1,000
by Deal (% of Total Par ∗100) 27.7 33.2 5.4 17.5 37.2 1,000
by Deal (% of Total Proﬁt) 23.5 18.9 7.5 19.9 36.0 823
Underwriter’s Discount:



















































































































































































































(b) Cross-sectional Average of Mean Markups per Issue and Day.
Figure 2: Markups over Reoﬀering Price by Transaction Type and Day since Issuance.
The ﬁgure plots gross markups for diﬀerent days since issuance and by transaction types. The solid
line represents sales to customers, the dotted line purchases from customers, and the dash-dotted
line interdealer transactions. The ﬁrst panel reports median markups in the pooled cross-section
by day since issuance. The bottom panel reports cross-sectional averages per day of mean markups
per bond issue and day. The trajectory of the cross-sectional median of mean markups is very
similar but about ﬁfteen basis points lower. The cross-sectional moments of median markups are

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(b) Markups on Sales to Customers without Transactions at the Reoﬀering Price.
Figure 4: Markups over Reoﬀering Price on Sales to Customers by Par Range and Day since
Issuance.
The ﬁgure reports cross-sectional averages of mean markups per issue and day since issuance. The
sample is split by the par amount of the transaction. The top panel includes all transactions
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(b) Money Left on Table in Deals by Uninformed Investors on Days
1-60.
Figure 6: Money Left on Table by Uninformed Investors
The ﬁgure plots the distribution of the money left on the table by uninformed investors across bond
deals as a fraction of the total proﬁts to the underwriting syndicate during the ﬁrst ﬁve days (top
panel) and ﬁrst sixty days (bottom panel) of trading. The dashed line represents the cumulative
frequency distribution. Money left on the table is deﬁned in equation (18). Total proﬁts are the
sum of the underwriter fees and the money left on the table.
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